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THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN CHANGING STATE
LAW: THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
MARK R. KRAMERt
When state law is unclear or rapidly changing, federal courts in
diversity jurisdiction face an awkward predicament. The doctrine of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins1 requires that they anticipate the law as
state courts would decide it. Federal courts, however, are often reluc-
tant to acknowledge indications of change in state law and tend to avoid
critical reappraisal of older state precedents.2 This Comment examines
the justifications for that reluctance and suggests that such constricted
adjudication does not further the policies of federalism. Excessive re-
straint may even distort the development of state law.
Part I briefly reviews the Erie doctrine and its implications for
federal courts anticipating state law, concluding that the policies of Erie
and its recent progeny, though developed in the context of procedural
law, must inform the process of determining state substantive law. Part
II offers jurisprudential arguments that critical reappraisal and inde-
pendent analysis are essential elements of adjudication. Part III traces
the interplay of state and federal courts in a specific context: the emer-
t B.A. 1979, Brandeis University; M.B.A. 1982, J.D. Candidate, 1985, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. The author wrote this Comment while a student at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Federal judges repeatedly profess a desire to avoid initiating change in state law.
As Judge Wyzanski observes,
The impression that I gather from the cases is that a federal judge sitting
in a diversity jurisdiction case is less willing to depart from obsolete doc-
trines than when he sits in a purely federal case. And this reluctance is not
apt to be modified by the action of his superiors in the federal courts ....
Thus the total tendency of the Erie Railroad doctrine has a strong reac-
tionary direction which it is hard to believe its proponents and expansion-
ists appreciated.
Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1281,
1300-01 (1952). See also, e.g., Boniuk v. New York Medical College, 535 F. Supp.
1353, 1356-58 (S.D.N.Y.) (recognizing lower state court and nationwide trends of
change but refusing to initiate modifications in the employment at will doctrine), affd
mem., 714 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982).
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gence of exceptions to the employment at will doctrine in
Pennsylvania.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has addressed the question of
exceptions to the employment at will doctrine only once, a decade ago.4
Since then, the handful of Pennsylvania superior courts that have
reached the exceptions have aggressively expanded them in nearly every
case.5 Seeking to avoid intrusion into state law, however, federal courts
interpreted the exceptions narrowly from the first. Lacking further
guidance from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,6 federal courts became
increasingly enmeshed in precedents of federal creation and came to
' The employment at will doctrine has long permitted an employer to discharge
an employee arbitrarily, unless the discharge is contrary to an explicit contractual obli-
gation. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. This doctrine covers most of the
workforce. See Note, Reforming At-Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 389, 389 & n.1 (1983). Courts have applied the doctrine harshly,
upholding terminations without cause and for malicious and illegal causes. See, e.g.,
Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (discharge for refusal to
falsify medial records); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1960) (upholding discharge for jury duty); Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn.
507, 518-19 (1884) (approving terminations for "good cause or for no cause, or even
for bad cause"), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn.
527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915). In the past decade a majority of states have di-
luted the doctrine with judicially created exceptions. See infra notes 89-106 and accom-
panying text.
" See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 107-25.
' See infra notes 126-41 and accompanying text. The most notable exception is
Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 466 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Super. 1983), a case
of first impression in Pennsylvania, involving wrongful discharge based on a violation
of the terms of an employment manual. The court relied on only federal precedent in
its search for Pennsylvania law, which may account for Richardson's anomalous result.
Even Richardson, however, acknowledged that Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456
Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), created a cause of action for discharge contrary to public
policy. Richardson has been squarely contradicted by a more recent Pennsylvania supe-
rior court case. See Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., No. 1205 (Pa. Super. June 15,
1984).
6 The Internal Operating Procedures of the Third Circuit do not allow one panel
to reverse a prior panel's interpretation of state law unless an intervening state supreme
court decision has clearly announced the change. See Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc.,
728 F.2d 221, 224 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing THIRD CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P.
VIII(C) ("[N]o subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel."),
reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. 78 (West Supp. 1984)); see also Telephone Conversation
with Judge Adams's Chambers (June 1, 1984) (interpreting Internal Operating Proce-
dure to forbid any panel to revise Third Circuit's interpretation of state law absent an
intervening decision from state's highest court). Because district courts are bound by
Third Circuit decisions, no change in state law may be recognized by federal courts
within the Third Circuit unless it is first announced by the state's supreme court. This
Internal Operating Procedure seems directly to contradict West v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940), which directs federal courts to ascertain state law from
all available data, including the holdings of intermediate state courts. In more practical
terms, the Third Circuit rule and others like it leave federal courts bound by precedent
from a time when the trend in state law was less apparent.
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diverge noticeably from the more aggressive holdings of the intermedi-
ate state courts. Only last year, in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance
Co.,' did Judge Adams of the Third Circuit finally offer a more expan-
sive reading of current state law that took into account the decisions of
intermediate Pennsylvania courts. Although crafted to avoid an explicit
overruling, the Novosel decision contradicted prior Third Circuit inter-
pretations.8 Strong criticism followed on Erie grounds,9 and earlier this
year Judge Adams retreated to a position more in line with Third Cir-
cuit precedent than with emerging state law.10
Part IV of this Comment examines the current posture of state
and federal courts regarding Pennsylvania's employment at will doc-
trine, arguing that Novosel has come closest to reflecting current state
law and furthering the principles of Erie. The Comment concludes
with a brief assessment of the substantive merits of the federal variant
of the Pennsylvania doctrine, concluding that, quite apart from the Erie
issue, it rests on shaky analytic foundations.
I. REQUIREMENTS OF THE ERIE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins" requires that federal
courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law, deci-
sional as well as statutory and constitutional."2 Most cases in which the
Supreme Court has explicated this doctrine have focused on the elusive
distinction between substantive law and procedural law" 3-- for federal
courts, even in diversity, apply federal rules of procedure. In some
cases, however, the substance/procedure inquiry is only the first step in
7 721 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1983) (recognizing a cause of action for discharge
against public policy where employee was fired for refusing to participate in employer's
lobbying campaign).
8 In particular, Novosel presented a version of Pennsylvania law directly contrary
to Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982). Novosel
presented a distinguishable fact pattern and did not overrule Bruffelt. Nevertheless, one
of the two rationales for the Bruffelt holding was that Pennsylvania would not yet
recognize a common law action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Novosel held that Pennsylvania would recognize such an action. No state cases reached
the issue between these two decisions. For further discussion of the tension between
these two cases, see infra notes 155-85 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Novosel, 721 F.2d at 903 (Becker, J., dissenting from denial of petition
for rehearing en banc). Judge Becker stated that Novosel virtually overruled the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court. He also asserted, citing one of the few Pennsylvania state
cases to deny a wrongful discharge action, that "Pennsylvania itself has apparently
shown no inclination to undertake" the path chosen in Novosel. Id.
10 See Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming
dismissal of complaint of wrongful discharge for refusing supervisor's sexual advances).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
s See id. at 78.
18 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 472 (1965).
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identifying the applicable legal rule, for a federal court may confront
substantive issues on which the law of the forum state is unsettled.
This section first sets forth the underlying purposes of the Erie
rule by reviewing the reasoning of decisions dealing with the sub-
stance/procedure distinction. It then argues that these same purposes
should guide federal courts in interpreting state law. Specifically, fed-
eral courts betray the spirit of Erie when they refuse to reconsider an
outdated precedent of the state's highest court. If a lower state court
would deviate from that precedent, a federal court that adheres to it is
not providing the same adjudication as a state court.
A. Policies Informing the Choice of State Substantive Law
Prior to Erie, federal courts applied state statutory law but de-
cided common law questions with complete independence.1 4 This led to
significant variation between federal and state courts in the interpreta-
tion of statutes and in the results of litigation.1" Skillful forum selection
enabled out-of-state litigants to gain substantial tactical advantages. 6
Substantive rights within the state varied according to the court of their
enforcement, subjecting citizens to different and contradictory interpre-
tations and threatening the equitable application of the laws.1 ' State
autonomy was threatened insofar as federal courts could enforce rules
of substantive law within a state that differed from those enunciated by
the state's own courts.1 To remedy this situation, the Erie Court held
that state substantive law must be applied, whether of statutory or judi-
cial origin. 9 Its goal was to produce uniformity between the decisions
of state and federal courts.20
The Erie decision, however, did not determine which rules of law
were substantive and which were procedural. The Supreme Court's
14 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that a federal court
sitting in diversity need not apply New York substantive common law). Interestingly,
the Swift Court noted that the New York rule was in a state of flux in the New York
courts, "greatly shaken ... if not overthrown," id. at 17-18-suggesting that an at-
tempt to find current state law might not have led to a different result and showing a
sensitivity to concerns of federalism.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
16 Id. at 73-75 (discussing Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi-
cab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)).
17 Id. at 74-75.
18 Id. at 78-80.
19 See id. at 79-80.
20 [E]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And
whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a stat-




most recent guidance on this question came in Hanna v. Plumer, 1
which set forth a two-step process of decision. If a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure covers the matter and the rule is arguably procedural,
the rule should be applied.22 In the absence of a federal rule, a diversity
court should consider whether application of federal law would produce
an outcome sufficiently different from the one a state court would
render to offend the twin aims of Erie-"discouragement of forum
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the law."2
The Court's test in Hanna was a retreat from the open-ended
balancing approach pursued in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-
operative.24 The Byrd Court began by asking to what extent the rule in
question was an integral and substantial element of a state-created
right. The Court then weighed the state interest in its rule against any
contrary interests of the federal court system.2" Emphasizing that "[tihe
federal [court] system is an independent system for administering justice
to litigants," '26 the Court held that the distribution of responsibilities
between judge and jury was an essential characteristic of the federal
system and that "'[s]tate laws cannot alter the essential character or
function of a federal court.' ,,27
The Byrd balancing test was itself a reaction against the rigid ver-
sion of outcome determination the Supreme Court originally adopted.28
21 380 U.S. 460 (1965). For a narrative of the evolution from Erie to the present,
see Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 694-97 (1974).
2 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74.
2, Id. at 468.
24 356 U.S. 525 (1958). At issue in Byrd were contrary state and federal rules on
whether judge or jury should decide a question of fact. The Court acknowledged that
application of the federal rule might lead to a different outcome from the one litigants
would receive in state court but found "affirmative countervailing considerations" in
favor of the federal rule. Id. at 537.
25 The Court did not describe its holding as a balancing test, but later commenta-
tors have so characterized it. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 21, at 693, 696, 709.
26 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
27 Id. at 539 (quoting Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931)).
" The Court adopted the outcome determination test in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Faced with the question whether a statute of limitations was
procedural or substantive, the Court held that the determinative criterion was whether
the choice of federal law would substantially alter the outcome of the litigation. See id.
at 109. Because the use of a different statute of limitations would have barred recovery,
federal courts were bound to apply state law. Id. at 108-09.
The York Court strongly endorsed Erie's aim of uniformity of decision between
state and federal courts. It described "a federal court adjudicating a State-created right
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties" as "in effect, only another
court of the State." Id. at 108. Suit brought "in a federal court instead of in a State
court a block away should not lead to a substantially different result." Id. at 109.
The York outcome determination test held sway for over a decade. See, e.g., Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949) ("It is conceded
that if the present case were in a Kansas court it would be barred. The theory of [York]
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That approach, forbidding the application of federal law whenever it
would affect the outcome, proved too extreme because, as the Court
acknowledged in Hanna,29 nearly every variation in procedure might
lead to a difference in outcome. The Byrd test in turn proved too inde-
terminate. Although the Hanna Court retained a version of outcome
determination, Byrd's emphasis on countervailing federal interests has
not been forgotten.
Courts currently apply a composite test, sifting through Erie and
its progeny for guidance."0 Certainty is rare outside the refuge of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the relevant considerations can
be specified. A federal court in diversity jurisdiction should act as an-
other court of the state. The extent to which a rule is an integral ele-
ment of a state-created right may be balanced against any contrary fed-
eral interests, although characteristics essential to an independent
federal adjudication must not be compromised in the balance. The out-
come of litigation should be sufficiently similar to discourage forum
shopping and to avoid subjecting residents to inconsistent or conflicting
judgments.
These factors can provide guidance for federal courts called upon
to interpret uncertain state law. A federal court should seek to render
the decision a state court would render. When an area of law is under-
going change in the lower state courts, a federal court will not achieve
this goal by adhering to antiquated precedent from the state's highest
court. Federal courts thus seriously misconstrue Erie when they con-
clude that Erie prohibits them from exercising independent judicial rea-
soning. Erie rather requires that federal courts use independent reason-
ing in searching for the rule of substantive law that the state's highest
court would apply.
would therefore seem to bar it in the federal court.").
n See 380 U.S. at 475.
so See, e.g., Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1496-97 (D.C. Cir.
1983), in which the court carefully analyzed whether the res judicata effect of a judg-
ment rendered by another federal court should be determined by state or federal law.
The court weighed the requirements of Byrd, Hanna, and Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), as well as the possible effect of its decision on Erie's twin
aims, concluding that Byrd's countervailing considerations precluded state law from
nullifying the effect of a federal court judgment. Similar analyses can be found in
Southern v. Plumb Tools, 696 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 1983); Yarber v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 674 F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 1982). The Third Circuit has attempted to distill
Erie and its progeny into a single three-step test. First, the court evaluates any probable
effect of the choice of law on the outcome; second, it determines the possible effect on
forum shopping; third, it weighs federal interests against the state's interest in its rule.
See Masino v. Outboard Marine Corp., 652 F.2d 330, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1982); Edelson
v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 133, 137-38 (3d Cir. 1979).
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B. The Determination of State Substantive Law
When a federal court must apply unsettled state law as its rule of
decision, it has few explicit sources of guidance outside the underlying
purposes of Erie. The Supreme Court routinely denies certiorari to
cases involving misinterpretations of state law by the federal courts,"'
and it has not directly addressed how federal courts ought to forecast
changing state law since 1956.32 A federal court may sometimes avoid
construing state law by certifying a question to the state's highest court
or by abstaining from a decision,"3 but these devices have serious
drawbacks.
Certification increases the expense of litigation and adds to the
volume of work facing state supreme courts without significantly di-
minishing the burden on federal courts. It requires the state court to
render an advisory opinion in a case it is not adjudicating. 3 Moreover,
in approximately half of the states, including Pennsylvania, certification
is not authorized, 3 and the momentum for its enactment has died
away.
3 6
SI Landes & Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior and the Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 373 (1980) ("[T]he Supreme Court rarely-if ever, in
modem times-reviews diversity cases."); see also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION 141-42 & n.11 (1973).
32 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
33 Certification permits federal courts to refer questions of state law to the state's
highest court for resolution. Abstention permits federal courts to decline to exercise
jurisdiction when faced with important questions of state law that have a substantial
potential impact on the state.
See generally R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BA-
SIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 202-03 (4th ed. 1978). Certification also delays liti-
gation by an average of 15 months. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey
and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REv. 317, 326-27 (1977).
If it were practicable, certification would be a nearly ideal solution to problems of
forum shopping. The Supreme Court has expressly endorsed its use. See Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) ("The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight,
has dealt with the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law. . . by
a statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful question. . . to the
Supreme Court of Florida for its decision."); see also Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S.
386 (1974) (instructing Second Circuit to consider certification); Dresner v. City of
Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963) (certifying question to Florida Supreme Court).
35 At present, 23 states provide for certification. In 1967 the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws passed a model statute authorizing certifica-
tion. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 49 (1975).
For a collection of cases and a listing of those states that have adopted a version of the
Uniform Act either by statute or by appellate rule, see 12 U.L.A. 17-20 (Supp. 1984).
This list excludes Maine and Hawaii, which have adopted rules not based on the Uni-
form Act. See 12 U.L.A. 50 (1975). See generally Note, Civil Procedure: Scope of Cer-
tification in Diversity Jurisdiction, 29 RTFGERS L. REv. 1155 (1976).
3' The pace at which states have enacted laws or court rules permitting certifica-
tion has dwindled over the last five years after extremely rapid expansion in the mid-
1970's. Only four states permitted certification in 1967, growing to 14 in 1975 and 21
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Abstention, alternatively, is an extraordinary remedy. Permitted
only when the question at issue is likely to have a substantial impact on
state interests,8 7 it runs contrary to the fundamental policy that courts
may not decline the resolution of controversies over which they have
jurisdiction.3 8 As a practical matter, moreover, abstention is not neutral.
It may be perceived as a verdict for the defendant, and it denies the
plaintiff's right to a federal forum. More frequent use would under-
mine diversity jurisdiction.
In most instances, therefore, a federal court must reach a decision
without the direct aid of state courts. Erie serves to remind courts of
their accountability to state law and cautions against unbounded reali-
zation of the federal judiciary's own desires. But Erie does not forbid
federal courts to participate in reforming state law when state courts
are themselves rethinking it or when changes in other state doctrines
indicate that state courts would rethink it if given the opportunity. Ide-
ally, a federal court should anticipate the holding of the state's highest
court. Can it best do so by refusing to recognize a new cause of action,
or by looking to changed circumstances that warrant a departure from
age-old precedent? If a federal court is to provide the same kind of
adjudication that a state court would, it must look to new developments
in the state's lower courts, to trends in analogous decisions of the state's
highest court, and even, at times, to sources outside the state.
Unfortunately, federal courts tend not to use independent judg-
ment when called upon to apply state law. For example, the Internal
Operating Procedures of the Third Circuit do not allow one panel to
reverse a prior panel's interpretation of state law unless an intervening
state supreme court decision has clearly announced change. 9 Because
district courts are bound by Third Circuit decisions, no federal court in
the circuit may recognize a change in state law until it is announced by
the state's supreme court. Although on a superficial level strict adher-
ence to the decisions of the state supreme court seems to effect compli-
in 1980. Since then only two additional states have approved certification. This slow-
down seems to be due to the infrequency with which certification is used. See 12
U.L.A. 50 (1975); id. at 17-20 (Supp. 1984).
3" See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
814 (1976); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
For an example of abstention in an employment at will discharge controversy, see
Boniuk v. New York Medical College, 353 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (S.D.N.Y.), affd
mem., 714 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982).
' See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it,
if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.") (Marshall, C.J.).
30 See supra note 6.
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ance with Erie, a federal court can hardly be said to be dispensing the
same justice as the state court "a block away"4 if it thus abdicates its
adjudicative function. The few Supreme Court precedents in the area
support the view that when dealing with state law, federal courts
should use "judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste-pot.'
1
Supreme Court opinions written soon after Erie expressed the
view that federal courts should behave exactly like state courts, reexam-
ining the law when a state court would have done so.' 2 Federal courts,
however, sought to retain some of their earlier authority by deciding
with complete independence those issues not definitively resolved by the
highest court of the forum state.4'3 To put an end to this trend, the
Supreme Court issued several decisions declaring that federal courts
were strictly bound by earlier state decisions-those of lower state
courts as well as those of the state's highest court."
Although these cases can be read to require that a federal court
behave like an automaton,' 5 their holdings must be understood in light
of their purpose to put an end to "the confusion and injustices arising
from inconsistent federal and state interpretations on state law.'
4
These cases do not mandate a wooden application of Erie. For exam-
ple, in West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,47 the Court de-
clared that in the absence of a clear directive from the state's highest
court, federal courts must look to other sources within the state rather
than create their own rules of law. The West opinion directed federal
courts "to ascertain from all available data what the state law is and
apply it rather than to prescribe a different rule, however superior it
may appear.'4 Decisions of an intermediate state court were "not to be
4' Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
41 Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 763, 775 (1941).
41 See Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939) ("[I]t
was [the federal court's] duty to apply the Texas law as the Texas court would have
declared and applied it on a second appeal if the cause had not been removed....
[The federal court was] free to depart from earlier rulings to the extent that examina-
tion of later opinions of the Texas Supreme Court showed that it had modified its
opinion on the first appeal."); Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 209
(1938) ("Now [the federal courts] must merely broaden their inquiry to include deci-
sions of the state courts, and just as they would in a case tried in the state
court . . .").
43 See, e.g., West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 235 (1940); see also
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court, and the Erie Doctrine in Diver-
sity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 205-06 (1957).
4 See, e.g., Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
" See Kurland, supra note 43, at 206-11. Kurland also calls this approach
"mechanical jurisprudence." Id. at 209.
" Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941).
47 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
48 Id. at 237.
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disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive
data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. '" The
line drawn here is subtle: federal courts may not substitute their inde-
pendent judgment for that of state courts, yet they must evaluate chang-
ing trends and intermediate court opinions to predict the state supreme
court's present posture.
The leading Supreme Court case on federal courts' determination
of state law remains Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America.50 Bern-
hardt held that the effect of an arbitration clause must be determined
under Vermont law: the underlying contractual right at issue was state-
created and therefore could not be altered by federal courts.51 The
Court divided, however, on what Vermont law was. The majority de-
ferred to the district court's finding that the governing precedent was a
1910 Vermont Supreme Court case holding arbitration agreements
nonbinding.5" Justice Frankfurter argued that the case should be re-
manded for consideration of whether state law had changed in the in-
tervening forty-six years, even though the change was not reflected in a
decision of the state's highest court.5
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence urged that federal courts ac-
tively adjudicate rather than passively apply antiquated precedent:
As long as there is diversity jurisdiction, "estimates" are nec-
essarily often all that federal courts can make in ascertaining
what the state court would rule to be its law. . . [The]
mere fact that Vermont in 1910 restated its old law . . . is
hardly a conclusive ground for attributing to the Vermont
Supreme Court application of this equitable doctrine in 1956
... . Law does change with times and circumstances, and
not merely through legislative reforms. . . . The attitude re-
flected by that decision nearly half a century ago was the
current traditional judicial hostility against ousting courts, as
the phrase ran, of their jurisdiction..
Surely in light of all that has happened since 1910 in
the general field of the law of arbitration, it is not for us to
"' Id. Accord Six Co. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 181-83
(1940) ("[It] makes little difference what state court has declared the law so long as it
is the rule of decision in the state."); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169,
177-78 (1940) ("[W]here the state law supplies the rule of decision, [federal courts
must] ascertain and apply that law even though it has not been expounded by the
highest court of the State.") (footnote omitted).
50 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
51 See id. at 202-04.
52 See id. at 204-05.
58 See id. at 209-12.
[Vol. 133:227
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
assume that [Vermont law is unchanged]."
Bernhardt thus suggests that federal courts may not draw from
precedents or sources of law outside the state, nor may they use inde-
pendent judgment to evaluate or revise substantive state law. Old prece-
dents must be left untouched absent clear portents of change. In prac-
tice, federal courts show a strong reluctance to reappraise state law or
announce change.55 Bound both by the highest and the intermediate
state courts, a federal judge in a diversity case has been described as a
mere "ventriloquist's dummy,156 forbidden to innovate or to extend the
law.
Bernhardt's deference to state law expressed the Court's resolve to
prevent the federal judiciary from ignoring state law. Bernhardt was,
moreover, a product of the strict version of outcome determination then
in force. At that time, the Court discouraged independent analysis and
extraterritorial sources of law on the same grounds that it required
even traditionally procedural issues to be left to state law when federal
law might produce a different outcome. The rigidity of this deference to
state law was the means by which an insistent Supreme Court conveyed
its message to federal judges reluctant to yield their independent do-
mains to state control.
But the view of the majority in Bernhardt is not so deferential to
state precedent as some have taken it to be. Bernhardt involved an area
of law in which there had been no indication of change within the state,
either by the courts or by the legislature. The majority found "no con-
fusion in the authorities that casts a shadow over the established ones,
no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont judges on
the question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the
"157judicial rule. We see no reason, therefore, to remand the case . ...
It is a fair implication that if there had been any clue that Vermont law
was changing, the majority would have remanded despite the forty-six-
year-old supreme court precedent.
Even if Bernhardt does support rigid adherence to outdated prece-
dent, however, its current force is mitigated by the subsequent changes
Byrd and Hanna have brought to the underlying Erie doctrine. Federal
courts must now make their decisions in light of the underlying aims of
Erie. A mechanical rule would not further those aims. Certainly, rigid
enforcement of an old precedent despite indications that state courts
Id. at 209-11.
55 See supra note 2.
" Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
57 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 204-05 (emphasis added).
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would discard it can produce both forum shopping and inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws. To ascertain how state courts would currently
rule, federal courts must be free to rethink the last state precedent, to
draw from dicta and from holdings of lower state courts although the
supreme court may once have addressed the issue, even to look to
sources outside the state boundaries. In short, they must proceed in the
same manner as an intermediate state court.
II. THE INHERENT NATURE OF CHANGE IN THE COMMON LAW
This section develops jurisprudential arguments that independent
analysis and critical reappraisal of precedent are essential to sound ad-
judication. Change and adaptation are inherent virtues of the common
law. To suggest that federal courts may not extend or modify state law
is not only to give litigants a different form of justice from that availa-
ble in state courts but is to repudiate the very essence of judicially cre-
ated law. Even if this course were wise, it would not be possible-for
even the refusal to change has consequences.5" Each use or avoidance of
precedent influences subsequent applications by expanding, constrict-
ing, or reinforcing previous law.
Of course, there can be little hope of proving these propositions.
The persuasive force of jurisprudential argument seems to depend
largely on the extent to which premises and prejudices are shared
before the argument is made. The positivist is unlikely to persuade the
realist, and neither is likely to win the economist's assent. Yet each of
these schools has accepted and found value in the tendency of common
law rules to adapt over time. This section collects support for the above
propositions from various schools of thought in the hope that at least
one will be aligned with the reader's own perceptions.
Legal realists deny that law can be distilled from precedent and
applied to new fact patterns with scientific or logical rigor. Rather, they
perceive law as responding primarily to the economic and political cli-
mate. For the realists, therefore, it is a truism that the common law
adapts to changing social and economic conditions."9 As Justice Car-
" See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 40-41 (1940) ("The judge
makes law even when he states that he is refusing to make it.").
59 Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253,
253 (1980); Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1029 n.43
(1981) ("Adaptation theory is so pervasive in the scholarship of the past two centuries
that it would be a challenge to find a work in which it was not present."). For leading
examples of the view that law responds to socioeconomic exigencies, see, e.g., L. FRIED-
MAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); M. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION




dozo stated, "The rules and principles of case law have never been
treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested
... . Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which
seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is
reconsidered." 60
Legal positivists, too, acknowledge that any legal system requires a
degree of flexibility in order successfully to resolve a wide variety of
problems in a continually changing context."1 H.L.A. Hart bases this
assessment on the simple human inability to predict the future.62
Neither precedent nor legislation can formulate a rule that will do jus-
tice in all future circumstances. The unenvisaged case is inevitable, and
therefore "[iun every legal system, a large and important field is left
open for the exercise of discretion by courts . . . in developing and
qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authoritative prece-
dent.''63 More fundamentally, Hart argues that language itself is neces-
sarily indeterminate. Even the dearest expression of a legal rule leaves
a degree of ambiguity that can be resolved only through an interpreta-
tion of underlying policies."
Those who validate law in economic terms also acknowledge that
change and independent judgment are essential. Judge Posner and
others who believe that the common law gravitates toward economic
efficiency have theorized that it does so primarily because of the behav-
ior of litigants.0 5 If judges do not decide cases on the basis of economic
efficiency, then economically efficient and inefficient decisions are made
randomly. Because there is a greater economic incentive for litigants to
60 B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921) [hereinafter
cited as B. CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS]. See also B. CARDOzO, THE GROWTH OF
THE LAW 69-70, 73 (1924) ("We may frame our conclusions for convenience as uni-
versal propositions. We are to remember that in truth they are working hypotheses.").
61 Any legal system, to remain viable over a span of time, must have the
flexibility to admit change. To find solutions for a succession of differing
problems in a continually changing context, it must be creative. On the
other hand, a group of institutions and their methods of operation cannot
constitute a system in the absence of strong elements of stability and pre-
dictability. Creativity must build upon a solid foundation of continuity.
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463, 463 (1962).
" See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1972); see also id. at 124-27.
63 Id. at 132.
6 See id. at 121-27.
65 See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Goodman,
An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393
(1978); Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235
(1979); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL
STuD. 51 (1977). See generally Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic
Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1980) (symposium).
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undertake the expense of challenging economically inefficient results,"s
inefficient rules will be attacked more often than efficient ones. Over
time, this will increase the percentage of efficient rules left standing.
7
If judges never depart from precedent, however, repeated challenges to
inefficient rules will not alter the results: the original percentages will
merely be perpetuated. 8 Thus even the economists' vision of progress
toward a corpus of efficient legal rules assumes that judges will recon-
sider earlier, inefficient holdings.
This consensus among divergent schools underscores the fact that
evolution is an essential attribute of the common law. Unlike statutes,
court decisions have only persuasive force for like cases in the future.69
The decision in a case binds only the parties and is rooted in the poli-
cies and equities of its moment.7 0 Not just the facts of the case but also
the social mores and the state of the law at the time the decision is
rendered contribute to its very meaning. Each application of precedent
alters that meaning. Even the application of a well-established rule ex-
"Although this assumption seems harmless enough and even intuitively attrac-
tive, several objections may be raised. For example, it is unlikely that judges do decide
cases randomly with regard to efficiency. Cases that make adjustments for inequitable
bargaining power may well be decided in a manner exactly contrary to efficiency. Simi-
larly, there is a greater incentive for plaintiffs to sue wealthy defendants. Assuming that
free market forces will channel wealth to the most productive entities, the most efficient
users of resources will most often be challenged. For an interesting rebuttal of Posner,
see Dworkin, Is Wealth A Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) (arguing that max-
imization of social wealth is not and should not be the function of courts).
67 An illustration may be helpful. Of 100 cases, suppose 50 are decided efficiently
and 50 are not. Suppose further that litigants challenge 50 of these 100 decisions in
new litigation, but-because the litigants are likelier to challenge inefficient re-
sults-they challenge 30 of the original 50 inefficient cases and only 20 of the efficient
ones. Suppose, finally, that courts again decide half these cases efficiently and half
inefficiently. The second round of litigation will leave 30 + 25 = 55 efficient rules
standing and only 20 + 25 = 45 inefficient rules standing. This example is taken
from Priest, supra note 65, at 68-69.
" A variation on the numerical example in note 67 illustrates such a perpetuation
of inefficient rules. If courts are unwilling to reconsider precedent, the second round of
decisions will not be independent of the first. Bound by the original 100 decisions,
courts will decide the 30 relitigated inefficient cases in the same way, leaving 30 + 20
= 50 inefficient precedents. To the extent that change is permitted in state courts but
avoided in federal courts, the process of improvement will continue, but at a much more
gradual rate.
69 Gorbin, supra note 41, at 772 ("The decision binds the litigants. It binds no-
body else. . . . [I]ts rationalizations are not legislative enactments, general in applica-
tion. They are merely 'persuasive data.' ").
70 [Elvery doctrine has its foundations in policy considerations of one kind
or another, whether explicit or not. . ..
• ..[P]olicy considerations are interwoven into the fabric of the doc-
trine itself. One who undertakes to interpret doctrine and to apply it inde-
pendently of attention to the policy considerations that are associated with
its creative decisional development misunderstands the doctrine itself.
Keetof, supra note 61, at 470.
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pands slightly the list of different fact patterns to which it applies."
More importantly, each application revitalizes the precedent, indicating
that the rule remains appropriate for the present day and state.7 2 It is
therefore wrong to suppose that a court chooses between change and
stasis. Whether it follows earlier holdings or abandons them, a court
affects the state of the law.
For this reason, the application of an earlier decision should never
be mechanical."3 The policies and equities that created the precedent
should be reexamined in the context of each subsequent application.
Founded equally on social policy and particular controversies, doctrine
must alter as policies and circumstances alter.7 4 As Professor Corbin
argued in an article written shortly after Erie and West were decided,
All rules of law are for the courts to apply-yes; but all
rules of law are also for the courts to change . . . . These
changes and these applications should indeed not depend
upon the accident of diversity of citizenship.
Where . . . a party is forced into federal court, it is
reasonable to hold that his rights should be determined in
accordance with the same system of law as would have been
applied had the case been in a state court.
Therefore, when the forum is a federal court, that court
must determine the applicable law by recourse to all the ju-
71 Every precedent ... has a "directive force for future cases of the same
or similar nature." . . . Once declared, it is a new stock of descent. It is
charged with vital power. It is the source from which new principles or
norms may spring to shape sentences thereafter .... [I]t is one of the
living forces of our law.
B. CARDozo, JunicrAL PRocEss, supra note 60, at 21-22 (quoting Redlich, The Case
Method in American Law Schools, Bulletin No. 8, Carnegie Foundation, at 37). See
also H.L.A. HART, supra note 62, at 126 (explaining that each application of a rule
further clarifies its meaning, purpose, and scope).
72 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has cited a federal district
court's use of an 83-year-old precedent as evidence of its continued vitality. See Geary
v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974) (citing Mc-
Kinney v. Armco Steel Corp., 270 F. Supp. 360, 362 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (applying
Henry v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 139 Pa. 289, 21 A. 157 (1891))).
73 H.L.A. HART, supra note 62, at 125; see B. CARDozo, JUDICIAL PROCFMs,
supra note 60, at 20-21 (law cannot evolve by mere process of comparing instant case
to precedents). See generally K.N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrION: DE-
CIDING APPEAis 62-120 (1960) (listing 64 ways in which judges extend, restrict, or
circumvent precedent in deciding appeals).
7' Keeton, supra note 61, at 470-72 (only a focus on the competing forces that
brought the doctrine about will guide its application to a subsequent judgment); Wel-
lington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 225 (1973) ("The [legal] profession generally recog-
nizes that it is an obligation of the courts to justify the rules they announce and to keep
the rules and their justifications up to date.").
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ristic data that are available to the state court. If the federal
judge is required to discard some of those available data, the
litigant is not getting the same justice that he would get if
the forum were a court of the state ....
Our judicial process is not mere syllogistic deduction,
except at its worst. At its best, it is the wise and experienced
use of many sources in combination-statutes, judicial opin-
ions, treatises, prevailing mores, custom, business practices
.... Shall a litigant . . . be deprived of the advantages of
this judicial process?
75
III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN
EVOLVING EXCEPTIONS TO THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
IN PENNSYLVANIA'
The history of the employment at will doctrine in Pennsylvania
offers an excellent example of the interplay between state and federal
courts in an area of rapidly changing law. Ten years ago the employ-
ment at will doctrine was virtually unchallenged. Today at least half of
the states have created exceptions.7 Pennsylvania's Supreme Court
welcomed reform in the very first wave of change,7 but only in dictum:
it has never held that the doctrine is modified or abolished in Pennsyl-
vania. Lower Pennsylvania courts have embraced reform, but federal
courts have shown an unwillingness to recognize this change. Because
federal courts have not been guided by developments in the lower state
courts, they are enforcing a distinctly different version of the law. In-
deed, the federal courts, often following federal precedent in the ab-
sence of later pronouncements by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
have developed an approach unknown in Pennsylvania law at any pe-
riod. Ironically, then, an overly literal interpretation of Erie Railroad
7' Corbin, supra note 41, at 772-75.
71 See Summers, Introduction, Individual Rights in the Workplace: The Employ-
ment-At-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 203 (1983) ("For a hundred years the
employment at will doctrine was unbending and seemed to go unchallenged; in ten
years it has largely disintegrated and is now under frontal attack."); see also infra notes
93-95 and accompanying text.
The literature on employment at will is vast. For recent bibliographies, see UN-
JUST DisMissAL 1983: LITIGATING, SETLING AND AVOIDING CLAIMS 117-28 U.
Barbash & J. Kauff eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as UNJUST DISMISSAL]; Decker, At-
Will Employment in Pennsylvania-A Proposal for its Abolition and Statutory Regu-
lation, 87 DiCK. L. REv. 477, 477 n.3 (1983); Note, Protecting Employees at Will
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. Rv. 1931
(1983).
7 See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
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v. Tompkins 8 has yielded federal common law-the very kind of law
that Erie condemned.
After describing the original employment at will doctrine and the
reform it has undergone throughout the United States, this section ex-
amines the changes that Pennsylvania courts have introduced in the
area and contrasts the intransigence of the federal courts. It then con-
siders the further discrepancy between state and federal law wrought
by purely federal additions to the law of wrongful discharge.
A. Nationwide Changes in the Doctrine of Employment at Will
The employment at will doctrine permits discharge for any or no
reason from employment not covered by a contract of explicit dura-
tion." No notice or explanation is required. The doctrine's initial ac-
78 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
79 See generally Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAv. L. REv. 1816 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Protecting At Will Employees]. Neither custom in the trade nor a
contract that clearly implies but does not require a specific term of employment suffices
to overcome the presumption that employment is at will. Similarly, an offer of "perma-
nent" employment or employment for life is considered too indefinite to provide a valid
term and therefore is also deemed to be at will. Note, Protecting At Will Employees,
supra, at 1816. The doctrine is applicable to approximately 60% of the American
workforce. See Note, supra note 3, at 389 & n.1.
Discharges for reprehensible reasons have often been upheld. See, e.g., Hinrichs v.
Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (discharge for refusal to falsify medi-
cal records); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 646, 152 Cal. Rptr. 52
(1979) (discharge for refusal to participate in price fixing scheme), rev'd, 27 Cal. 3d
167 (1980); Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979) (discharge for
reporting kickback payments received by superior). See generally Note, Protecting At
Will Employees, supra, at 1816-17. Courts have held that discharge even for a morally
bad cause is-legally acceptable. See Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-
19 (1884).
Surprisingly, the origins of the doctrine of employment at will are not in English
common law. See Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 485 (1976). In fact, America seems to be the only
industrialized nation to have such a doctrine. Id. at 508-19; see also Summers, supra
note 76, at 203-04. Of 126 countries, the United States was the only member of the
International Labor Organization to vote against a convention on termination of em-
ployment in 1982. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guaran-
tee, 16 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 207, 210-18 (1983).
English law presumed employment for a year's term and required notice custom-
ary in the trade. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-21 (1976); Note, The Employment at Will Rule: The Devel-
opment of Exceptions and Pennsylvania's Response, 21 DuQ. L. REv. 477, 478-80
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Pennsylvania's Response]; Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 340 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Implied Contract Rights]; see Summers, supra, at 485. Earlier English and American
law held the master responsible for the health and welfare of her servant. See Note,
Protecting At Will Employees, supra, at 1824. Blackstone justified the English rule on
the equitable grounds that one ought not be able to hire a worker only in harvest and
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ceptance has been attributed to the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
interfere with "liberty of contract" or with the employer's fifth amend-
ment property right in the employee's labor.80 There was a perceived
mutuality between the employee's freedom to quit without notice and
the employer's ability to discharge.81 The doctrine was also justified by
characterizing the employment relation as a unilateral offer by the em-
ployer, accepted continuously by the employee's labor but capable of
withdrawal at any time. 2
Since the beginnings of the labor movement, the attitudes on which
the doctrine was based have seen numerous changes.8 Legislative acts
have curtailed the employer's unbridled power over the employee," and
the emergence of collective bargaining has shown that such power is
not essential to our economic system. Approximately twenty percent of
the workforce is covered by collective bargaining agreements, and
ninety percent of these agreements limit the employer's right of arbi-
planting seasons, discharging her at less productive times. See 1 W. BLACESTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *425-26.
82 The origin of the doctrine in America has been attributed to an ill-supported
statement in a widely respected legal treatise, H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT §
134, at 272-73 (1877). For a discussion of the four cases on which Wood relied and an
argument that these cases neither supported him nor reflected the true state of the
doctrine in the United States, see Note, Pennsylvania's Response, supra note 79, at 480
nn.18-20; Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 79, at 341-42 & n.54.
The Supreme Court's refusal to invade employment relationships is exemplified by
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Court invalidated a state law
setting a 10-hour daily maximum and a 60-hour weekly maximum for bakers' working
hours. The Court maintained its deferential attitude toward employers in the period
following the Lochner decision. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915);
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908); see also Summers, supra note 79, at
485-86; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 79, at 1826.
81 The employee's labor is seen as consideration only for wages. Additional con-
sideration must be shown for any promise of a guaranteed term of employment. Note,
Pennsylvania's Response, supra note 79, at 480 n.26; Note, Protecting At Will Employ-
ees, supra note 79, at 1818-19 (collecting cases).
82 Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 79, at 1818-19. For an exam-
ple of this attitude in a recent Pennsylvania case, see, e.g., Wagner v. Sperry Univac,
458 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd mem., 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980).
82 See generally Summers, supra note 76, at 203-04; Summers, supra note 79, at
491-93.
See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829, 833 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42
U.S.C.) (protecting employee retirement benefits); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26,
29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.) (protecting employees from unsafe working conditions); National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) (authorizing unionization);
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) (minimum wage);
Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation in hiring on basis of race, creed, or sex). For a fuller listing of legislative enact-
ments limiting the employer's right to control employees, see Note, Protecting At Will
Employees, supra note 79, at 1827 nn. 63-67.
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trary discharge."5 Another eleven percent of the workforce is covered by
the "just cause" limitation of the civil service regulations."8 Courts have
begun to recognize the disparity between the stake an employee has in
her livelihood and the interest an employer has in arbitrary discharge.8 '
In general, the attitude that originally protected the employer from any
state interference has long since disappeared."'
Change in the doctrine, however, came only recently. The first
case to uphold a cause of action for wrongful discharge, decided in Cal-
ifornia in 1959, involved an employee fired for refusing to commit per-
jury.' In 1973 Indiana's Supreme Court extended a cause of action to
an employee fired for filing a worker's compensation claim." And in
1974, in the leading case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,91 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court upheld an action by a woman discharged
for refusing her supervisor's sexual advances. The New Hampshire
court took the longest strides, holding that unjustified discharges were
unlawful as contrary to the state's economic interests.92
The pace of change began to accelerate in the late 1970's. 3 Cur-
rent estimates of the number of states with exceptions to the employ-
ment at will doctrine vary from twenty-one to thirty-four.9" More sig-
85 Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 79, at 1832 n.89.
*6 See 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982).
87 See, e.g., Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 573-76, 583, 422
A.2d 611, 618-19, 623 (1980).
88 The Supreme Court long ago abandoned the posture of extreme restraint mani-
fested in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to recognize due
process rights in cases of unjust discharge from government employment. See, e.g.,
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
" See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App.
2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
90 See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
91 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
82 See id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52. But see infra note 105 (discussing New
Hampshire's retreat).
9 See Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the
Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1979).
" See Note, supra note 3, at 394 n.29 (counting 29 states as having recognized
exceptions and five others as having acknowledged the possibility of exceptions in cer-
tain circumstances). For a collection of wrongful discharge cases from all 50 states, see
Wrongful Discharge: Employment at Will, 1 LABOR RmAToNs EXPEDITER (BNA)
939-87 (Aug. 1, 1983) (counting 21 states as recognizing public policy exceptions and
13 as recognizing implied contracts in employee handbooks) [hereinafter cited as
Wrongful Discharge]. See generally UNJUST DISMISSAL, supra note 76; DeGiuseppe,
The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and
Fringe Benefits, 10 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 1 (1982) (discussing implied contract and
public policy exceptions).
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nificantly, of the thirty-six state supreme courts that have addressed the
issue directly in the last decade, twenty-five have created exceptions to
the traditional doctrine.95
Several legal theories have emerged to justify and delimit the ex-
tent of those exceptions. The mildest and most commonly accepted the-
ory admits the employer's right to arbitrary discharge with a single
caveat prohibiting discharges for reasons contrary to public policy."
Unless the discharge affects the integrity of the legal system, such as a
discharge for accepting jury duty or refusing to perjure,9 7 the public
policy exception is usually limited to policies that find expression in a
statute or other legislative source." The next most frequently accepted
theory is one of implied contract, found either in the behavior of the
parties or in the terms of employee handbooks and personnel manu-
als. 9 The court may hold the employer to the terms of the manual10
or having found an implied contract may impute such additional terms
as employment for a reasonable time.01 or a requirement of good faith
termination. 0" Although it is of more recent origin, approximately half
the states that recognize. exceptions to employment at will have adopted
this theory. 0 8 The most progressive theories adopt a duty of good faith
or a requirement of just cause in all terminations,'0 a course few states
have followed. 0 5
95 See Note, supra note 76, at 1931 & n.4; see also Wrongful Discharge, supra
note 94 (stating that 24 of the 40 highest state courts to consider the employment at
will doctrine in the last six years have created exceptions); cf. Note, supra note 76, at
1931 ("A veritable avalanche of scholarly opinion has, with near unanimity, come
down in favor of abolishing the at will rule.").
" See Note, Pennsylvania's Response, supra note 79, at 493-96.
' See e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 369, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975)
(en banc); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119
(1978).
98 See, e.g., Brockemayer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 109 Wis. 2d 44, 324 N.W.2d 70
(1982).
" See, e.g., Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 408 (1978); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980).
100 See, e.g., Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54
(1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980).
101 See Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 79, at 358-59.
102 See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977).
103 See Wrongful Discharge, supra note 94, at 940.
104 See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 F.2d 549 (1974).
But see infra note 105.
105 Massachusetts, Alaska, Oregon, and Montana have taken this route. See
Wrongful Discharge, supra note 94, at 940-87. Pennsylvania state superior courts have
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Legal theories are still coalescing as courts freely mix various con-
tract and policy theories.10 6 The trend toward liberalization of the strict
doctrine of employment at will, however, is unmistakable. And the
courts of Pennsylvania have been receptive to this wave of reform.
B. The Doctrine in Pennsylvania State Courts
Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad"0 7 best expresses the
classic employment at will doctrine in Pennsylvania. Affirming nonsuit,
the judge held that an employer "may discharge an employee with or
without cause, at pleasure, unless restrained by some contract;. . . I do
not see that the questions of malice and want of probable cause have
anything to do with the case."' 08 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court fol-
lowed this principle without exception,' 09 citing it in dicta until
1959.110 Since then the court has addressed the doctrine only once, in
Geary v. United States Steel Corp."'
Geary, a salesman and an employee at will of fourteen years, be-
lieved that the steel tubing he was selling had been inadequately tested
and might be unsafe. Although he sold the tubing as instructed, he was
discharged for insubordination after expressing his concerns to manage-
ment. The tubing was eventually taken off the market. Geary brought
developed a test that amounts to a just cause requirement. See Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980); see also infra text accompanying notes
132-38.
Some states have enacted statutes requiring employers to show just cause for ter-
mination where the employment is for a specified period of time. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-310 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-4-5 (1978). Puerto Rico requires
just cause even where the period of employment is not specified. See P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 29, § 185(a)-(b) (Supp. 1983).
New Hampshire, meanwhile, has drawn back from its holding in Monge that all
dismissals must be for just cause. It has construed Monge to apply only to situations
where an employee is discharged because she performed an act that public policy would
encourage or refused to perform an act that public policy would condemn. See
Clouthier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981); How-
ard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).
106 See generally Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 79, at 1818-24.
"07 139 Pa. 289, 21 A. 157 (1891) (ticket agent discharged without good reason in
the course of an investigation into embezzlement).
108 Id. at 297, 21 A. at 157.
100 See, e.g., Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 368 Pa. 448, 451, 84 A.2d 323, 325
(1949) (representations of anticipated success do not create promise of employment over
period of time); Polk v. Steel Workers Organizing Comm., 360 Pa. 631, 634, 62 A.2d
850, 852 (1949) (employee may be discharged for refusing to join union); Trainer v.
Laird, 320 Pa. 414, 415, 183 A. 40, 40 (1936) (contract fixing compensation annually
does not defeat employment at will presumption).
110 See, e.g., Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 397 Pa. 152, 157-58, 153
A.2d 483, 485 (1959).
1 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
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an action for wrongful discharge, in which he claimed to have acted
only in the interests of public safety.
Geary's claim was weak at best. His discharge affronted no ex-
plicit legislative policy. The record showed almost no support for his
assertion that the pipe was hazardous. Geary had no training or exper-
tise that could justify his evaluation of technical specifications, and he
had violated company policy by appealing to senior management over
his immediate supervisors. Despite these facts, the court split four-to-
three in refusing to recognize a cause of action.
The split appears to have been less on principle than on whether
this particular case should be the fulcrum for change. Both the majority
and the dissent agreed that reform was desirable, but only the dissent
found the time and case to be at hand.112 The dissent argued that a
threat to public safety, if demonstrated, would sufficiently implicate
public policy to support a challenge to the discharge."' 3 The majority,
however, citing a federal district court case, found that the Henry rule
was still accepted as valid law"14 and was in accord with the weight of
authority elsewhere." 5
The majority feared uncharted territory: it felt that an overruling
of the established doctrine would be too great a shock to employment
relations.11 " Nonetheless, the majority warmly supported reform in
dicta. Beginning with a lengthy and approving discussion of the nascent
public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine, the majority
acknowledged that economic conditions had changed significantly from
112 See id. at 193-94, 319 A.2d at 185.
113 See id. at 187, 319 A.2d at 181.
114 See id. at 175, 319 A.2d at 176 (citing McKenney v. Armco Steel Corp., 270
F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1967)). Such state court reliance on federal diversity cases
suggests that the Erie model, which envisions law as created by state courts and applied
by federal courts, is too simplistic. Each court system relies on the other in times of
change or uncertainty, and each contributes to the formation of the common law.
15 See id. at 175-76 & nn.4-5, 319 A.2d at 176 & nn.4-5. The court cited § 762
of the Restatement of Torts and 53 AM. JrR. 2D Master & Servant §§ 34, 43 (1970)
("The employer enjoys an absolute power of dismissing his employee without cause.").
The cited portion of American Jurisprudence refers one to American Law Reports,
which in 1975 was still able to state that "few legal principles would seem to be better
settled than [the principle that] an employment for an indefinite term is regarded as an
employment at will which may be terminated at any time by either party for any rea-
son or for no reason at all." Annot., 62 A.L.R.3D 271, 271 (1975).
If the court were to look to the same sources of authority today, it would find a
different approach. The Restatement section has been deleted. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
oND) OF TORTS § 762 (1979). The same section of American jurisprudence lists 41
cases from 22 jurisdictions upholding exceptions to the doctrine. 53 AM. JuR. 2D
Master & Servant § 43 (Supp. 1984).
a1 See Geary, 456 Pa. at 175, 319 A.2d at 175-76 (quoting Henry, 139 Pa. at
297, 21 A. at 157).
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the time of Henry.117 The Geary court quoted at length from a seminal
law review article hostile to the doctrine"1 8 and paraphrased the New
Hampshire Supreme Court's Monge decision. Although the Geary
court questioned whether the time had come for judicial reform, '19 it
agreed that the doctrine must be restricted. 20 The court examined the
two existing legal theories that might have justified an exception to the
doctrine. Finding neither a tort theory of malicious discharge nor a
statutorily recognized public policy applicable to the facts,"' the major-
ity was careful to conclude that "it is not necessary to reject the ration-
ale of these decisions in order to defend the result we reach here."1
22
To appreciate the significance of Geary, one must remember that
Geary was among the first five cases in the country to admit even the
possibility of an exception to the doctrine of employment at will.112 In
extrapolating from Geary to ascertain what the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would decide today, one must apply its reasoning to present cir-
cumstances. Despite the weakness of the plaintiff's case, three of the
seven justices would have granted a cause of action. Admittedly, a ma-
jority of the court declined to recognize the action, but their treatment
of the doctrine was extremely progressive compared to that of other
states at the time. It may fairly be inferred that on better suited facts
the court would have recognized such exceptions to the doctrine as then
existed. Other legal theories that might have fit Geary's case better
than the theories then available were not yet developed.1 ' Moreover,
the majority in Geary based its holding partly on its reluctance to di-
verge radically from a nationally accepted body of law and the expecta-
"x See id. at 176, 319 A.2d at 176.
See id. (quoting Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Lim-
iting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLTJm. L. REv. 1404 (1967)).
111 See id. at 177, 319 A.2d at 176-77.
120 See id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
12 See id. at 177-83, 319 A.2d at 177-80.
122 Id. at 183 n.16, 319 A.2d at 180 n.16.
1* The four earlier cases are Snyder v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 33 Cal. App.
3d 977, 109 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1973); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 396, 174 Cal. App, 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
124 Federal courts have interpreted Geary to hold that no other exceptions to the
doctrine exist in Pennsylvania. See infra note 142. But given the Geary court's reliance
on factors that have changed, its aggressiveness compared to other state courts at the
time, and the extent to which it reached out to discuss questions not essential to the
case, it is likely that the court would have endorsed exceptions that have emerged since
Geary. See supra note 115. In particular, the court did not reach the theory that em-
ployee handbooks may be taken as implied contracts. Although no court at the time had
accepted such a theory, it is now the law in 13 states. See Wrongful Discharge, supra
note 94, at 940.
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tions of employers. 125 Given the rapid trend of subsequent change, a
desire to conform to national standards would augur a contrary result
today.
In the ten years since Geary, seven Pennsylvania superior courts
and four lower courts have decided wrongful discharge cases.1"6 All
credited Geary with establishing a cause of action.127 The state courts
have moved beyond Geary's dicta: one court has held that an employ-
ment manual may constitute an implied contract,128 while another, in
effect, has introduced a requirement of just cause for termination of
employment.12
The first state decision to apply Geary embraced the public policy
exception. In Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc."'0 an employee was
allegedly discharged for accepting jury service. The court found that
Geary, together with precedent from other states, justified a cause of
action." 1
Two years later, in Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 13 2 the superior
court adopted a very progressive test. The employer's privilege, it said,
was no longer absolute: "it exists in the context of, and must sometimes
yield to, other interests including the interest of the employee in making
a living, and the interest of the public in seeing to it that the employer
does not act abusively."1 ' Yaindl held that courts "must weigh several
factors, balancing against the appellant's interest in making a living, his
125 See 456 Pa. at 184-85, 319 A.2d at 180.
126 See Cisco v. United Parcel Servs., 476 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. 1984); Banas v.
Matthews Int'l Corp., No. 1205 (Pa. Super. June 15, 1984); Richardson v. Charles
Cole Memorial Hosp., 466 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Super. 1983); Sacks v. Commonwealth, 465
A.2d 981 (Pa. Super. 1983) (public employment); Yaind v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281
Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980); Hunter v. Port Auth., 277 Pa. Super. 4, 419
A.2d 631 (1980) (public employment); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Turner v. Letterkenny Fed. Credit Union, No. 1982-
66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 14, 1984); Cuccaro v. United States Steel Corp., 131 Pitt.
L.J. 534 (1983); Grundon v. Defense Activities Fed. Credit Union, 33 Comb. Co. L.J.
529 (1983); Butler v. Negley House, Inc., 129 Pitt. L.J. 350 (1981).
12 7 Decisions denying a cause of action did so because no public policy was impli-
cated. The courts did not doubt that Geary announced a change in the law. See Cisco v.
United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1341 (Pa. Super. 1984); Richardson v.
Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 466 A.2d 1084, 1085 (Pa. Super. 1983). This position
is in marked contrast to federal interpretations, which for many years read Geary as
leaving the employment at will doctrine unchanged. The federal courts still interpret
Geary in this way occasionally. See infra note 142.
12 See Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., No. 1205 (Pa. Super. June 15, 1984).
129 See Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 132-38.
130 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
131 See id. at 30, 386 A.2d at 120 (citing, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536
P.2d 512 (1975) (holding discharge for accepting jury service unlawful)).
132 281 Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980).
133 Id. at 571-72, 422 A.2d at 617.
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employer's interest in running its business, its motive in discharging
appellant and its manner of effecting the discharge, and any social in-
terests or public policies that may be implicated in the discharge."'
Applying this test, the court found that no public policy was implicated
and that the decision to discharge had received an independent good
faith review by a senior company official. These facts suggested that the
discharge was valid."3 5
Although the Yaindl court based its discussion on the public policy
exception created by Geary, its reading of public policy was expansive,
recognizing that "a discharge motivated by bad faith or malice or based
on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system."'36 The
Yaindl standard goes considerably beyond the more commonly recog-
nized "statutorily based public policy" exception, in effect establishing
a just cause requirement. An employee's interest in her livelihood will
usually seem stronger than an employer's interest in any nonproductive
arbitrary discharge.13 7 Furthermore, a discharge for reasons other than
just cause will tend to affront the public interest in economic effi-
ciency' 8 or to reveal motives unacceptable to the court. Consequently,
any discharge other than for just cause should tip the balance of the
Yaindl test in favor of the employee.
Yaindl is not the only case to have taken an approach even more
progressive than the one suggested in the Geary dicta. Recently, in
Banas v. Matthews International Corp.,' a Pennsylvania superior
court held that "a manual published or authorized by an employer and
distributed to an employee-at-will becomes part of the parties' employ-
ment contract"' 40 and that deviation from its terms can justify an action
134 Id. at 577, 422 A.2d at 620.
135 Id. at 578-80, 422 A.2d at 620-21.
138 Id. at 573 n.5, 422 A.2d at 618 n.5 (citing Monge). Geary acknowledged two
possible causes of action-a traditional tort action for malicious discharge and a public
policy exception. Judge Spaeth interpreted the tort action as a special feature of the
broad public policy exception because malicious discharge was not in the public
interest.
137 See, e.g., Yaindl, 281 Pa. Super. at 584, 422 A.2d at 623-24 ("The law...
accords little, if any, weight to the vindictive spirit, but it accords great weight to the
individual's right to earn a living.").
13 See, e.g., Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52.
's No. 1205 (Pa. Super. June 15, 1984).
140 Banas, slip op. at 13. Banas was an at-will employee of 20 years who made
bronze tombstones. The manual authorized employees to use scrap metal for personal
jobs if they received permission from their supervisor. Banas received permission to
make a tombstone for his nephew. A management memorandum seen only by supervi-
sors directed that employees not be permitted to make tombstones on their own as it
interfered with business relations between the company and the cemeteries it supplied.
When the tombstone was discovered, Banas was fired. A jury awarded him $10,000 for
breach of contract and $40,000 for defamation and punitive damages because, at his
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by the employee in assumpsit for breach of contract. Banas, like Geary,
Yaindl, and other Pennsylvania cases, shows a strong desire to reform
the law, reaching out beyond the facts to adopt theories as liberal as
any accepted by other states.""1
dismissal, his supervisor called him a thief. On appeal, the superior court vacated and
remanded the defamation award but affirmed the breach of contract verdict.
The superior court characterized the at-will employment relation as a unilateral
offer continuously accepted by the employee's labor. The employment manual becomes
a part of the employer's offer when it is issued; it is accepted by the employee's contin-
ued work. The employer may change or rescind the manual at any time. If the em-
ployee shows up for work the next day, she has accepted the altered terms.
Although the court gathered some support from Pennsylvania law for attaching
significance to employee manuals, the cornerstone of its holding is its recognition of
change outside the state. See Banas, slip op. at 11 n.5 (citing precedent from nine other
states).
141 Two Pennsylvania cases since Geary have refused to allow a wrongful dis-
charge claim. The first Pennsylvania case to consider the question of the contractual
force of employee manuals, Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 466 A.2d
1084 (Pa. Super. 1983), reached a conclusion opposite to Banas. Richardson, a director
of nursing, was fired without just cause after four years' employment. A clause in his
employee manual provided that the hospital's policy was to continue employment as
long as work was performed satisfactorily. The court held that the policies set forth in
the employee handbook did not constitute part of the Richardson's contract of employ-
ment. The policies were gratuitous benefits, unilaterally extended by the employer and
unenforceable by the employee.
Federal courts in Pennsylvania had already denied the contractual force of em-
ployee manuals three times before the decision in Richardson. See Rogers v. Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (manual too
vague); Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
("[F]ailure to adhere to company personnel policy does not create a cause of action for
breach of an employment contract."), affd mem., 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979); Wag-
ner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505, 519-21 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (summary judgment
precluded by genuine issue of fact regarding whether employer actually breached con-
tract), affd mem., 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980). Although the question had never
been resolved by a Pennsylvania state court, the Richardson court cited Beidler to sup-
port the statement that Pennsylvania did not acknowledge implied contracts. See Rich-
ardson, 466 A.2d at 1085. Given the federal judiciary's cautious attitude toward alter-
ing state law, such reliance by a state court on federal precedent seems rather ironic. As
the Banas court noted, the precedent on which Richardson relied has been substantially
weakened. See Banas, slip op. at 9 n.4.
The other state case since Geary to have denied a cause of action for wrongful
discharge is Cisco v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. 1984). A
customer charged a deliveryman with theft. While charges were pending, United Parcel
Services forced the deliveryman to resign. He brought his wrongful discharge case
when the company refused to reinstate him after his acquittal. Id. at 1341. Although
the court upheld dismissal of the claim, it acknowledged the existence of a wrongful
discharge action in Pennsylvania, crediting its origin to Geary. Id. Reviewing the tril-
ogy of Reuther, Yaindl, and Hunter v. Port Auth., 277 Pa. Super. 4, 419 A.2d 631
(1980), the court reiterated the Yaindl balancing test, concluding that these cases man-
dated a "thorough review of the circumstances surrounding a discharge of an at-will
employee." Cisco, 476 A.2d at 1343. The court concluded that no public policy was
violated where the employer's reputation was threatened by the mere accusation of a
job-related crime and where the employer fired the employee to protect its reputation.
See id. at 1344.
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C. Federal Court Interpretations
Under Erie, federal courts should be sensitive to emerging state
law, echoing the changes made and anticipating those foreshadowed by
state courts. The federal courts' interpretation of Pennsylvania's em-
ployment at will doctrine, however, contrasts sharply with state
developments.
Federal courts in Pennsylvania have resolved unjust discharge
cases thirty-seven times since Geary. In contrast to the five out of seven
state cases recognizing an action, the federal courts have upheld a cause
of action for wrongful discharge only nine times. 1412 The reluctance of
The Cisco court interpreted Geary and its progeny as requiring a two-part test.
First, a court must ask whether any public policy is threatened; second, it must ask
whether the employer had "separate, plausible and legitimate reasons" for the dis-
charge. Id. at 1343. This test, however, seems inappropriate for summary judgment. If
a public policy is implicated and the employer contends that a permissible alternative
motive led to the discharge, then the decision depends on a factual determination of the
employer's true motive. The existence of this factual issue should cause the claim to
survive a motion for dismissal or summary judgment. This was exactly the situation
presented in Reuther and the rationale on which summary judgment was denied.
Moreover, the Cisco court's test is dangerous insofar as it suggests that a discharge
that violates public policy might nevertheless be insulated by an innocent alternative
rationale. Employee terminations are complex and are often susceptible to different
explanations. If an alternate reason can defeat a public policy violation, the public
policy exception seems likely to lose all force.
142 The following cases have dismissed wrongful discharge actions or granted
summary judgment for defendant: Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d
Cir. 1984) (sexual harassment claim preempted by statutory remedy); Bruffett v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982) (termination allegedly
because of physical handicap that did not affect job performance); Bonham v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977) (age discrimination), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
821 (1978); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., No. 83-3644 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1984)
(age discrimination claim preempted by statute); Buckmon v. Wilmington Dry Goods
Store, No. 82-1167 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1984) (alleged violation of public policy); Adams
v. Budd Co., 583 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (implied contract and public policy
claims); Ruch v. Strawbridge & Clothier, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(alleged breach of terms of personnel manual); Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F.
Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (sexual harassment claim preempted by statutory remedy);
Harrison v. Fred S. James, P.A., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (alleged
breach of implied contract); Madreperla v. Williard Co., No. 82-3505 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
17, 1982) (public policy violation); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776
(W.D. Pa. 1982) (discharge for refusing to drive overloaded trucks; motion to dismiss
allowed, but plaintiff given leave to amend complaint); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co.,
541 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (discharge for refusal to participate in price fixing);
Wood v. Burlington Indus., 536 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (alleged oral contract for
permanent employment); Boreson v. Rohm & Haas, 526 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (discharge for unsatisfactory performance), affd, 729 F.2d 1445 (3d Cir. 1984);
Huff v. County of Butler, 524 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (discharge for alleged
sexual harassment); Fleming v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 917 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(alleged discharge for disclosing embezzlement); Moorhouse v. Boeing Co., 501 F.
Supp. 390 (E.D. Pa.) (alleged oral contract for permanent employment), affd, 639
F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980); Rogers v. International Business Machines Corp., 500 F.
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federal courts to countenance change has led them to invent strands of
doctrine alien to state law.
1. Federal Court Interpretations Prior to Novosel
In the four years following Geary, only federal courts found occa-
sion to interpret Pennsylvania's employment at will doctrine. None ac-
corded any weight to Geary's dicta; all relied instead on earlier cases.
Two federal decisions granted summary judgment without any mention
of Geary,143 while two others cited it for the proposition that Pennsyl-
vania "recently reaffirmed the employment at will doctrine. "144
Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discharge contrary to employee manual); Lekich v. Inter-
national Business Machines Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (bad faith);
Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (discharge contrary to
personnel manual), affd mern., 609 F.2d 500 (1979); Walker v. University of Pitts-
burgh, 457 F. Supp. 1000 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (discharge allegedly for exercising right to
free speech); O'Neill v. A.R.A. Servs., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (dis-
charge in bad faith and contrary to public policy); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F.
Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (age discrimination); Geib v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 419 F.
Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (implied contract); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ.,
412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (public policy and first amendment); Green v.
Medford Knitwear Mills, 408 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (implied contract).
Even after Yaindl, federal courts have refused at times to see that Pennsylvania
would allow any exception at all to the classical employment at will doctrine. See Wells
v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Pennsylvania has neither recog-
nized nor advanced ... challenges to the traditional doctrine [of employment at
will]."); Jenkins v. United Steel Workers of Am., 522 F. Supp. 80, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(expressing doubt as to whether a tort of wrongful discharge exists in Pennsylvania).
Only the following federal cases have recognized wrongful discharge actions:
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (public policy and im-
plied contract); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)
(discharge on basis of polygraph test); Karr v. Township of Lower Merion, 582 F.
Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (public policy); Rettinger v. American Can Co., 574 F.
Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (discharge because of disability and filing of worker's com-
pensation claim); Molush v. Orkin Extermination Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (discharge on basis of polygraph test); Forman v. BRI Corp., 532 F. Supp. 49
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (alleged hiring for reasonable time); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (discharge for refusing to participate in price fixing);
Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (discharge contrary to
employment manual); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (rationale unrelated to Geary reasoning).
"I See Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264, 1278 (M.D. Pa.
1976); Green v. Medford Knitwear Mills, 408 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
144 See Walker v. University of Pittsburgh, 457 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (W.D. Pa
1978); Geib v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 419 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
One case, McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975), did
uphold an action for discharge contrary to public policy, but did so without mention of
Geary, on the novel rationale that any contract, including a "contract at will," that is
breached in contravention of public policy creates a cause of action. 407 F. Supp. at
910. But the employment at will relationship was not a contract under traditional doc-
trine. With this exception, all eight federal court cases that followed Geary and pre-
ceded Reuther refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge. See supra
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The first federal case to recognize Geary's message interpreted it
with remarkable narrowness and in effect devised a test to avoid its
application. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp.14 involved a discharge allegedly
in violation of a statement in the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act146
(PHRA) that age discrimination in employment is contrary to public
policy.1 47 Although the Wehr court acknowledged Geary's statement
that an action might lie when a discharge violated a statutorily ex-
pressed public policy, it held that a common law action' could not be
brought if the statute already carried a remedy for the violation. 4 Be-
cause the PHRA provided for a remedy, the court dismissed Wehr's
action. The Third Circuit adopted Wehr's restriction when it addressed
the wrongful discharge question for the first time, in Bonham v.
Dresser Industries, Inc.,1 49 a case presenting another instance of age
discrimination. The court held that under Pennsylvania law the PHRA
provided the exclusive remedy for a violation of its policies.15 '
The "no alternative remedy" test does not appear in Pennsylvania
cases, nor can it be deduced from their reasoning. Indeed, it is paradox-
ical in light of the emerging state law: Geary's dicta require that the
public policy be statutorily recognized, but any statute that declares an
explicit policy is likely to carry its own remedy, thereby forestalling a
wrongful discharge action under Wehr and Bonham. The "no alterna-
tive remedy" test, then, is a purely federal invention.
Even after the aggressive state holding in Yaindl, federal courts
have recognized wrongful discharge actions only rarely. 51 When they
have, they have interpreted the action narrowly, unlike the state
courts,1 52 and kept the "no alternative remedy" test alive. 153 One expla-
note 142.
141 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
146 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1984-85).
"' The PHRA provides:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this Commonwealth to
foster the employment of all individuals in accordance with their fullest
capacities regardless of their race, color, . . . handicap or disability, . . .
age, sex, or national origin, and to safeguard their right to obtain and hold
employment without such discrimination ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85).
148 See Wehr, 438 F. Supp. at 1055-56.
149 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
160 See id. at 195. But see infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
152 Compare, e.g., Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 577, 422
A.2d 611, 620 (1980) with, e.g., Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d
910, 918-19 (3d Cir. 1982).
"I This test formed the rationale of the Third Circuit's most recent denial of a
wrongful discharge claim. See Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.
1984); see also Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 915-20 (3d
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nation is the strong tendency of federal courts, even in diversity matters,
to rely on federal precedent rather than state cases."" Such reliance is
misplaced under any interpretation of Erie. To a degree, of course, fed-
eral courts are bound by prior holdings and must be mindful of reversal
by higher federal courts. The clear dictate of Erie, however, is that
federal courts apply state law in diversity actions. When state law is
changing, Erie requires that federal courts be sensitive to that trend.
Until the state law becomes settled, federal courts should approach each
case afresh, undertaking a search for state law at that moment, and not
relying on prior federal interpretations. Federal courts' failure to reap-
praise their own precedents in the face of new holdings by lower state
courts and dicta by the state supreme court is a violation of the spirit of
Erie.
2. The Conflict Between Bruffett, Novosel, and Wolk
Federal courts applying Pennsylvania law have not been uni-
formly insensitive to state developments in the doctrine of employment
at will. This has led to a substantial discrepancy of result within the
Third Circuit in the cases of Bruffett v. Warner Communications,
Inc.'55 and Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.'"
Bruffett involved termination of temporary employment and with-
drawal of a permanent job offer because of a physical handicap that did
not affect the employee's performance. 157 Such a discharge is contrary
to the public policy of Pennsylvania as expressed in the PHRA.'58 Af-
ter finding that the employment was at will, the Third Circuit held
that under Bonham the existence of a remedy in the PHRA precluded
a wrongful discharge action. Permitting recovery would give plaintiffs
an opportunity to avoid the "carefully drafted legislative procedures"
Cir. 1982).
15" A study by Landes and Posner found that federal courts applying state law are
two and one-half times more likely to cite federal precedent than to cite state precedent
and concluded that "state courts cite mainly state cases and federal courts mainly fed-
eral cases." Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 374-75. This pattern is instrumental
in slowing federal recognition of change in state law. See, e.g., Wells v. Thomas, 569 F.
Supp. 426, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing federal cases and finding that Pennsylvania law
recognizes only a narrow exception to the employment at will doctrine).
155 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982).
156 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
157 Bruffett was hired temporarily, then offered permanent employment on the
condition that he pass a routine medical exam. The exam disclosed Bruffett's diabetes,
which in no way affected his work. The job offer was withdrawn and his temporary
position eliminated.
'5" See supra note 147.
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that circumscribed the PHRA's remedies.159 The court did recognize
that in Fye v. Central Transportation, Inc.,160 a case decided after
Bonham, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the PHRA pre-
cluded other remedies only when invoked;" 1 it also recognized that
Bruffett had not invoked the PHRA. Nonetheless, the court held that
the existence of an unexercised and nonexclusive alternative remedy
precluded a wrongful discharge action. The court found this test consis-
tent with Pennsylvania law, arguing that in the only cases admitting
exceptions to the employment at will doctrine there was no alternative
remedy. 162 This is not so.163
The Bruffett opinion is an instance of the federal courts' unwill-
ingness to recognize change in state law. It viewed the Geary court's
rejection of the plaintiff's cause of action as "placing Pennsylvania with
those states which have viewed the public policy exception in a more
constricted fashion."" The Bruffett court relied on the fallacious
view "65 that in refusing to recognize new causes of action it was not
influencing state law. "One of the authentic obligations of federalism at
the judicial level," the court said, "requires that we permit the state
courts to decide whether and to what extent they will follow the emerg-
ing law."1 68
In sharp contrast to Bruffett, the court in Novosel adopted an ex-
pansive interpretation of exceptions to the employment at will doctrine
in Pennsylvania. Novosel, an insurance company employee for fifteen
15' Bruffett, 692 F.2d at 919.
160 487 Pa. 137, 409 A.2d 2 (1979).
"" See id. at 140-41, 409 A.2d at 4. This reasoning follows the plain meaning of
the PHRA, which states that it "shall, when invoked, be exclusive." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985) (emphasis added).
16 See 692 F.2d at 919.
16 See, e.g., Reuther, 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (upholding cause of action
for employee discharged for performing jury duty). Although not discussed in the opin-
ion, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 4563 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985) authorizes an em-
ployee to bring suit for reinstatement and back pay against an employer who dismisses
her because of jury duty.
The "no alternative remedy" test is also at odds with earlier federal holdings. In
Davis v. United States Steel Corp., 581 F.2d 335, 340-41, vacated on other grounds en
banc, 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 (1983), the Third
Circuit acknowledged a cause of action for wrongful discharge in addition to a remedy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). And in McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111
(E.D. Pa. 1979), a district court upheld both a right of action under the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), and a separate action for discharge in violation of public
policy.
18 Bruffett, 692 F.2d at 919. This statement is simply inaccurate, given Pennsyl-
vania's aggressive position relative to other states at the time Geary was decided, to say
nothing of the later expansion of Geary's reasoning in Reuther and Yaindl.
' See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
166 692 F.2d at 920.
19841
258 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
years, was discharged when he refused to assist his employer's lobbying
for the elimination of no-fault auto insurance. The court allowed both a
tort claim for discharge against public policy and an implied contract
claim based on company practice and personnel policies. 
1 7
The Novosel court noted the substantial erosion of employment at
will nationwide: twenty-nine states had admitted exceptions to the doc-
trine, and six others had indicated their willingness to do so.168 It was
against this background that the court analyzed Geary, paying less at-
tention to federal interpretations than to state trends. The court con-
cluded that Pennsylvania would recognize a cause of action for a dis-
charge that violated a clear mandate of public policy." 9 In its search
for public policy the court endeavored to reach the same result as a
state court. The Novosel court decided that
an important public policy is in fact implicated wherever the
power to hire and fire is utilized to dictate the terms of em-
ployee political activities . . . While there are no Pennsyl-
vania cases squarely on point, we believe that the clear direc-
tion of the opinions promulgated by the state's courts
suggests [that they would uphold a cause of action].
17 0
The Novosel opinion directed that the district court on remand ap-
ply the Yaindl balancing test to determine if the employee's interest in
free speech and a livelihood outweighed whatever impairment might be
shown to the employer's interests.
Novosel's analysis of the employment at will doctrine is consistent
with Erie. In deciding Novosel, Judge Adams recognized that his task
was to predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the
problem today, and not to opt for an unthinking application of the last
precedent from that court.17 Using this approach, Judge Adams found
that lower Pennsylvania courts had interpreted Geary generously
172
and acknowledged the aggressive Yaindl balancing test to be current
187 See 721 F.2d at 894, 903. Whether the Novosel court was correct in anticipat-
ing an action based on implied contract is an interesting question. Richardson v.
Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 466 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Super. 1983), decided almost si-
multaneously, refused to recognize such an action. More recently, however, Banas v.
Matthews Int'l Corp., No. 1205 (Pa. Super. June 15, 1984), upheld such a claim.
a See 721 F.2d at 896.
168 See id. at 898.
170 Id. at 900.
171 Id. at 896-97 (citing Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978), for the proposition that federal courts
must take note of emerging trends when they find state law).
17 See id. at 898.
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state law.173 Although Novosel was carefully constructed to avoid over-
ruling Bonham and Bruffett, 74 its interpretation of the employment at
will doctrine in Pennsylvania is thoroughly contrary to those cases. Un-
fortunately, Novosel, a product of a faithful application of the Erie
rule, has not been consistently followed. Indeed, it has been undercut
by the very judge who wrote it.
In Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc.'75 Judith Wolk alleged that
she was discharged because she rebuffed her supervisor's sexual ad-
vances. Discharge for such reasons violated the sex discrimination poli-
cies of the PHRA. Affirming dismissal, Judge Adams held that the
possible existence of a remedy under the PHRA precluded the recogni-
tion of a wrongful discharge action in Pennsylvania, not because the
PHRA was exclusive, but because the absence of an alternative remedy
was a prerequisite to recognizing a wrongful discharge action under
state law.
17 6
Wolk also claimed a violation of the terms of an implied contract
under Novosel. Judge Adams distinguished and undercut his precedent
by declaring that Novosel required only a careful examination of the
facts. Where full discovery had already been conducted, dismissal was
appropriate.
17 7
The Wolk opinion emphasized the constraints on a federal court
rather than the merits of the claim. Despite strong sympathy for the
plaintiff, the court concluded that
there is no indication that the Pennsylvania courts have as
yet fashioned or indicated their intention to fashion a uni-
form just cause requirement for all discharges. Absent such a
declaration on the part of the state courts, a federal tribunal
sitting in diversity is not empowered to take this step for the
173 See id. at 901.
174 Novosel noted that no alternative remedy was available, thereby satisfying the
Bruffett rule. See Novosel, 721 F.2d at 898-99.
175 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984). The Wolk opinion began by stressing the "grad-
ual emergence" of change in the common law. Id. at 222. Novosel, said the court,
must be understood against the backdrop of the limited role of a federal
court sitting in diversity jurisdiction. While a federal court must be sensi-
tive to the doctrinal trends of the jurisdiction whose law it applies, it is
beyond the authority of a federal court in such circumstances to create
entirely new causes of action.
Id. at 223 (citing Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978), the same case cited to justify Novosel's progressive
approach; see supra note 171).
178 See id. at 224.
177 See id. at 224-25.
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state courts.
1 7 8
This assessment of Pennsylvania law is inappropriate. As the Novosel
court recognized, Pennsylvania courts have fashioned a wrongful dis-
charge remedy broad enough to compensate Judith Wolk, whose dis-
missal violated public policy as expressed in the PHRA. Wolk would
thus have suffered a compensable injury even if Pennsylvania courts
had never indicated their intention to fashion a uniform just cause re-
quirement. The Yaindl balancing test, in any case, is tantamount to a
just cause requirement. Although it spoke of deference to state law, the
Wolk court in fact was unduly deferential to federal precedent.
Judge Adams claimed that he was bound by Bruffett, noting but
not justifying the fact that Bruffett was at odds with state law. 717 In a
footnote, he referred to the binding force of prior panels' decisions
under Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure.' 8 In the absence of
an announcement of change by the state's highest court, Judge Adams
believed that he could not depart from the holdings of earlier federal
cases.
Such a refusal to examine "all available data"'81 would have cre-
ated a rift between state and federal interpretations of the employment
at will doctrine even if federal courts had simply reiterated the doctrine
in its original form every time the issue arose. Federal courts have
made some concessions, however, to modern trends. Out of the tension
between the need for reform and the practice of following the exact
holding of the most recent precedent from the state's highest court has
come a requirement unknown in state law, the lack of an alternative
remedy." 2
IV. THE CURRENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE DEMERITS OF THE "No ALTERNATIVE REMEDY"
TEST
After Wolk and Novosel, federal courts no longer deny the exis-
tence of a wrongful discharge action, 8' even when they find it inappli-
178 Id. at 225.
17 In fact, Judge Adams highlighted this departure from state law by referring to
the dissent in Bruffelt. See Wolk, 728 F.2d at 224.
"I See id. at 224 n.3; see also supra note 6.
181 West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
182 Indeed, at least one Pennsylvania court has recognized a cause of action for
wrongful discharge notwithstanding the existence of a statutory remedy. See supra note
163 (discussing Reuther). The "no alternative remedy" requirement was therefore in-
consistent with state law from the first.
183 See, e.g., Hansrote v. American Indus. Technologies, Inc., No. 81-218 (W.D.
Pa. June 7, 1984) (declining to overturn jury verdict for discharge against public policy
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cable to the facts or rely on earlier federal precedent to interpret it
narrowly.184 But the "no alternative remedy" requirement remains a
central difference between state and federal doctrine. This discrepancy
can now be altered only by a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court or by a Third Circuit decision en banc. An overly rigid applica-
tion of Erie has meanwhile produced a persistent strain of federal com-
mon law that results in differences in outcome and subjects citizens to
inequitable administration of the laws. Given the expansive range of
employment abuses condemned by the PHRA, 88 few wrongful dis-
charge actions seem likely to survive in federal court.
The discrepancy has also produced a strong forum shopping incen-
tive. Wrongful discharge defendants are typically large national corpo-
rations that are amenable to diversity jurisdiction. Whenever possible,
these defendants will remove to a federal forum, because the substantive
law there is friendlier to employers. It is not surprising, therefore, that
federal courts have decided so many more wrongful discharge cases
than state courts have. This adds a further distortion by decreasing the
opportunities for state courts to clarify and develop the law. The simple
command of Erie to let the common law evolve in the state courts be-
comes unrealistic when the overwhelming majority of cases are decided
in federal forums.
Even if we leave these Erie concerns to one side, the premises of
the "no alternative remedy" test seem questionable. Two rationales
have been offered in defense of the test: that the creation of a common
law remedy would enable plaintiffs to "circumvent the carefully drafted
legislative procedures" of the PHRA,88 and that there is no need to
permit a common law action when another remedy already exists.
18 7
The first of these rationales has some initial appeal. One can read-
ily imagine carefully drafted remedies being circumvented by coarser
common law judgments. The PHRA, however, manifests no legislative
intent to preclude common law remedies consistent with its policies.188
and contrary to terms of implied contract); Karr v. Township of Lower Merion, 582 F.
Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (denying motion to dismiss claim of wrongful discharge).
'" See, e.g., Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., No. 83-3644 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29,
1984); Buckmon v. Wilmington Dry Goods Store, No. 82-1167 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6,
1984); Adams v. The Budd Co., 583 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984). All refuse wrong-
ful discharge actions as a matter of law, treating the public policy exception as very
narrow and citing federal precedent.
158 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 952(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), quoted supra
note 147.
lee Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 919 (3d Cir. 1982).
187 See id. at 920.
1" See Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimination, 58
TEMPLE L.Q. (forthcoming March 1985). Greenbaum argues that the provisions of the
employment discrimination laws are not so integrally related to statutory remedies as to
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The PHRA is exclusive only when invoked' 89-leaving plaintiffs the
alternative of common law relief.
Even when invoked, moreover, the PHRA ultimately depends on
judicial oversight. The PHRA prescribes no detailed system of remedies
but rather authorizes a broad remedial scheme, including "such affirm-
ative action . . . as, in the judgment of the Commission, will effectuate
the purposes of this act."1 ' The legislature limited such broad discre-
tion only by requiring that enforcement orders be secured from Penn-
sylvania courts."9 " And if the Commission has not taken prompt action,
the plaintiff is expressly permitted to turn to the courts for relief.
1 9 2
The PHRA, in short, is more easily read as a supplement to common
law remedies, dependent on judicial cooperation, than as a legislative
substitute.1 9
The superficiality of the argument that statutory remedies must be
read as supplanting common law actions, is revealed by the ease with
which it can be-and has been-inverted. Courts frequently conclude
from the absence of explicit statutory remedies that the legislature in-
tended not to afford a cause of action for wrongful discharge.19 4 If ex-
ceptions to the employment at will doctrine must rest on statutorily
recognized public policy, and if statutes carrying a remedy and those
preclude common law relief and that courts are obligated to supplement statutory poli-
des with common law remedies so long as the legislature has not clearly manifested a
contrary intent.
189 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
190 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959(0 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
'0' See id. § 960 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
192 See id. § 962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
198 The PHRA's legislative history is skimpy. Nothing suggests an explicit at-
tempt to substitute legislative remedies for judicial ones. What language there is sug-
gests that the PHRA was intended to set certain minimum safeguards that could be
enhanced by local communities or the courts. See Pennsylvania Legislative Jour-
nal-Senate 300 (Feb. 1, 1961) (remarks of Senator Weiner).
194 See, e.g., Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1980)
("While the harshness of the terminable at will rule is subject to exception in light of
express legislative action, the absence of explicit statutory provision of a civil remedy in
the Mississippi workmen's compensation statute argues against recognizing a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge."); Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 748
(7th Cir. 1977) ("We think it rather unlikely that a retaliatory discharge prohibition
would have been omitted from this comprehensive and integrated legislation if it had
been intended."); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1120 (D.
Mass. 1980); Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 1192, 295 S.W.2d 122, 126 (1956)
("[W]e feel constrained to assume that had the legislature desired to provide for [a
cause of action], such a provision would have been incorporated [in the worker's com-
pensation statute]."); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 297, 244
S.E.2d 272, 275 ("If the General- Assembly of North Carolina had intended a cause of
action be created, surely, in a workmen's compensation statute as comprehensive as
ours, 'it would have specifically addressed the problem."), cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465,
246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
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making no explicit provision for one are both excluded, then little scope
would seem to remain for the exception. One can escape this paradoxi-
cal conclusion only by recognizing that the presence or absence of an
explicit statutory remedy does not in itself support an inference that the
legislature either did or did not intend that an alternative, common law
remedy be available.195
The second rationale for the "no alternative remedy" require-
ment-that the existence of one remedy obviates the need for an-
other-also has some intuitive validity. But the presence of an alterna-
tive remedy makes a common law action unnecessary only where the
remedy provides comparable relief. Pennsylvania courts have consist-
ently held that the Human Relations Commission has no authority to
award compensatory damages or damages for mental anguish, inconve-
nience, humiliation, or disruption of normal family life."' These inju-
ries are integral to the loss of employment. They are likely components
of any jury award for wrongful discharge, 19 7 and there is no alternative
remedy for them.
CONCLUSION
In areas of rapidly changing law, federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction inevitably play a formative role. Interpreting change nar-
rowly does not diminish federal influence; on the contrary, it may lead
to distortions of state law and cause forum shopping effects as severe as
those forbidden by Erie. While a federal court must not substitute its
preferences for established state law, federal courts must be as willing
as intermediate state courts to extend the law.
The current status of the employment at will doctrine in Pennsyl-
vania is an example of distortion arising from aversion to change. Most
federal cases decided in Pennsylvania have adopted a narrow approach
unsupported by Pennsylvania law as the state courts have expressed it.
Federal courts continue to apply conservative federal precedent, un-
"' See generally Gamin & Eisberg, The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 UMKC L.
REv. 292 (1972); Note, Implying Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARv. L. REv. 285, 289-91 (1963).
1" See, e.g., Lee v. Walnut Garden Apartments, Inc., 479 Pa. 142, 387 A.2d 875
(1978); Pennsylvania Human Relations Conm'n v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 387
A.2d 70 (1978) (per curiam). The coui't in Zamantakis reasoned that the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission should not be empowered to award such damages be-
cause it lacked all the "formal trappings, evidentiary protections, and strict procedures.
of a court of law"-language that highlights the limits of the PHRA as an alternative
remedy. Id. at 458, 387 A.2d at 72 (footnote omitted).
197 Cf Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., No. 1205 (Pa. Super. June 15, 1984) (va-
cating and remanding jury award of $40,000 for defamation and punitive damages in
wrongful discharge action).
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deterred by later state interpretations. They have created a requirement
that no alternative be available to a common law remedy, thereby limit-
ing the reach of change in state law, and the requirement persists de-
spite increasingly liberal state decisions. Although Novosel v. Nation-
wide Insurance Co.19 has finally established a federal precedent more
indicative of present state law, it has not overthrown the "no alternative
remedy" requirement.
The Erie doctrine need not limit federal courts to mimicking the
last state supreme court precedent, nor does it forbid federal courts to
initiate change. While federal courts must engage in an honest investi-
gation of current state law, a degree of critical analysis and indepen-
dence of judgment is essential to competent adjudication. With it must
come a willingness to change when necessary.
1s 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
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